Notes on CRASSH debate, Clare College, Cambridge, 29 Sep 2010 Is Building Bigger and 'Better' Climate Change Models a Poor Investment? My position is that we need more investment in climate science, but that building bigger climate models is a poor investment compared to the alternative, which I will describe. In climate science we can distinguish between what we might term 'academic' climate science and 'policy' climate science. These both have their place, but difficulties arise when science funders think they are paying for policy climate science but actually get academic climate science. This is what I want to talk about, and bigger climate /simulators/ are at the heart of the issue. In a nutshell, academic climate science is about understanding how the large-scale regularities that we see in the weather, particularly the mean or average weather, emerge as a result of microscale processes in the atmosphere and oceans. Climate simulators based on microscale principles can be used to demonstrate---through computation---the emergence of these large-scale regularities. This requires a big climate simulator with a high resolution in space and time---such simulators are known as General Circulation Models, or GCMs. There have been some notable successes with the latest generation of GCMs, such as a much better understanding of the El Nino Southern Oscillation, and the way that this affects the mean weather on a planetary scale. There are still some problems, though, such as an unrealistic representation of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone. It is thought that building yet bigger GCMs with yet higher resolution will resolve some of these problems. *Academic* climate science is a fascinating area, and someone more knowledgeable than myself, for example Prof Tim Palmer, would be able to keep you spellbound for several hours with a description of what GCMs can and cannot do, and why, and what this tells us about the nature of the climate system. **For *policy* climate science, however, the focus is different.** Policy climate science is about *climate as the /distribution/ of weather*. This focus on the whole distribution (rather than mainly the mean) is important because we humans are affected directly by extremes: heatwaves, for example. We are also affected indirectly through the impact of extreme weather on our infrastructure, and our environment. So understanding the distribution of weather, especially the tails of the distribution, is crucial for policy. Now a prediction of the *distribution of future weather* has three stages. * First, there is the distribution of weather within a GCM. This requires multiple evaluations of the GCM under different initial conditions, because weather is a manifestation of the chaotic nature of the underlying equations. An analogy would be my journey into work. Making the journey again and again, where each trip is subtly different, allows me to infer a /distribution/ of journey times. With GCMs, I would expect the distribution of weather to be strangely-shaped, owing to the well-known features of forced dynamical systems, for example that they oscillate and bifurcate. * Second, we must account for the limitations of the GCMs. For all the progress that has been made in the last twenty years, GCMs provide a very limited representation of a system as complex as climate. This is not going to change in the foreseeable future, unless there is a total revolution in computing. To capture the effect of these limitations on uncertainty we need to repeat the weather calculation in the first stage, many times. This repetition is across the range of all GCM versions that are consistent with our understanding of the climate dynamics and physics. For any given GCM, there is a huge number of versions meeting these conditions. * Third, we need to account for uncertainty about the future. This is typically represented by alternative scenarios. So we need to repeat the first two stages for each of the future scenarios that we can envisage. The latest thinking proposes /four/ Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), out to 2100, so these would be our future scenarios. Repeated runs of a GCM at different choices of initial conditions, for different versions, and over different future scenarios would be loosely termed 'replications' in Statistics, and that is how I will refer to them here. So, how many GCM replications might we need to estimate a distribution for future weather? As a gross approximation, my guess is that we will need about 1000. The crude number is probably much larger, but I am assuming that we can reduce it to 1000 by using careful sequential experimental design. The design and analysis of experiments is something that Statisticians have studied for nearly 100 years, and it has had profound effects in fields such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine. The last 20 years has seen the development of methods specifically for computer experiments. So far, these methods have been little used in climate science, although I think that is beginning to change. So, how long would it take to do 1000 replications? GCMs currently run at about one hundred simulated years per calendar month on the Met Office supercomputers, and we might be able to run in parallel batches of ten without compromising the daily weather forecast. Allowing for the cost of also running a regional climate simulator (for downscaling to policy-relevant spatial and temporal scales), 1000 replications might take twelve years. Twelve years is quite a long time to wait, so can we reduce it? If (i) Moore's Law continues to hold, and (ii) the Met Office gets a new supercomputer every three years, and, crucially, (iii) there is /no/ increase in GCM resolution, then this comes down to seven years. I should add that we are not starting from scratch with this kind of experiment: many parts of it are already in place, and UK scientists have been at the forefront of this effort, for example in the UKCIP study. So my case in a nutshell is that *bigger climate simulators* are better for *academic* climate science, but *more replications of current climate simulators* are better for *policy climate science*. This is because it is a basic principle that replications are necessary to quantify uncertainty, and there is a /lot/ of uncertainty about future weather. To return to my first point, science funders have to be clear about which type of climate science they want. To make a /policy/ case for bigger GCMs it must be shown that they lead to an improved assessment of uncertainty, particularly in the tails of the weather distribution. And this must be despite reducing the number of replications that are possible for the same computing budget. To my knowledge, such a case has yet to be made. I would certainly support more investment in climate science, but I do not think bigger GCMs are the right investment for /policy/ climate science, particularly when there is a pressing need for policy decisions. Thank you. Jonathan Rougier Department of Mathematics University of Bristol, UK